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Chapter 4
Company Stock and Pension Plan
Diversification
Krishna Ramaswamy
Defined contribution (DC) plans are an important and growing form of
private retirement system in the United States,1 and they are growing
increasingly popular in the rest of the world as well (see Walliser, Chapter 11,
this volume and Turner and Rajnes, Chapter 12, this volume). In many
of these plans, the employee’s contribution to the plan is matched by the
employer, so there is a strong incentive to participate. A notable feature of
such plans is that the employee takes charge of his own investment decisions,
thereby bearing the risk of fluctuating returns to the chosen investments. By
contrast, the defined benefit (DB) plan specifies a promised benefit formula
for the employee, and the employer funds the plan and selects its investment
portfolio. In this latter case, the risk of DB plan asset returns is borne by com-
pany shareholders, together with the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
in the US context.
A key feature of a DC plan, often perceived as a plus, is that it empowers
the beneficiary to take charge of his retirement planning in accordance
with his income and preferences. Nevertheless market volatility and corpor-
ate bankruptcies have underscored the lack of adequate diversification in
the portfolios of many DC plan participants. DC participants with lopsided
portfolios, holding a great deal of company stock, have suffered losses when
their employers experience financial distress. Sometimes employees hold
undiversified positions because the firm’s matching contribution is made in
company stock, and this investment may not be altered until they attain a cer-
tain age (typically 50 or 55). Even when an employee is permitted to direct
his employer’s matching contribution, the data indicate that employees tend
to invest substantial amounts in company stock, and hence they are inad-
equately diversified.2 Note, however, that there is no insurance provided to
DC plan participants to protect them against the avoidable decline in their
portfolios due to overweighted company stock. By contrast, DB plan spon-
sors have access to insurance against decline in plan assets, and furthermore
I am grateful to Olivia Mitchell and Steve Utkus for their comments, to Ron Stambaugh and
Craig MacKinlay for helpful discussions, and to Choong-Tze Chua and Alexander Grantcharov
for research assistance.
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they are restricted from owning more than 10 percent own company stock
in the plan portfolio (see Mitchell and Utkus, Chapter 3, this volume).
What causes employees to sometimes ignore the sensible advice that
they should diversify, given that they are surely provided such advice from
many sources? The fact that this question is hard to answer points out that
academics may have failed to educate practitioners and professionals who
dispense investment advice to the typical DC plan participant.3 Finance text-
books, of course, show that dividing a portfolio’s wealth equally among an
increasing number of (randomly chosen) equities lowers portfolio variance.
Furthermore, Modern Portfolio Theory shows that knowledge of the means,
variances, and covariances can help find a portfolio that minimizes risk at
every level of expected return. Surprisingly, these ideas have apparently not
been harnessed to assess the diversification level of a typical 401(k) plan
participant’s portfolio.4
This chapter makes two contributions. First, it develops a measure of
the diversification level in a DC plan participant’s portfolio. This measure
computes how much additional risk reduction can be had by reallocating
investments among the choices permitted within the DC plan, without chan-
ging the expected return of the currently chosen portfolio. (Of course,
the participant may be constrained from reallocating that part of his port-
folio held in company stock.) I call this an ‘‘efficiency’’ measure, related to
the closeness to the frontier discussed in Kandel and Stambaugh (1995).
It computes the reduction in risk available by moving to the mean--variance
efficient frontier, at the participant’s chosen level of expected return.
It should be emphasized that in the current context, we confine ourselves
to examining the diversification of the individual’s 401(k) plan assets; thus
we ignore the possibility that he might have sizable assets and achieve
diversification outside the plan.
Second, the chapter shows that the plan participant can privately avail
himself of insurance against the decline in his wealth attributable to his
undiversified position within the DC plan. This insurance takes the form
of an option contract that gives the recipient the higher of the return to
company stock or a diversified (suggestively, index) portfolio over a given
future term: the resulting return would be applied to the dollar amount
invested in company stock. This insurance gives the participant a rate of
return at least as great as on the diversified index, when applied to the
amount invested in company stock. Indeed, if the employer so chooses, this
insurance can be attached to the matching contribution made in company
stock. The cost of the insurance can be borne by (or shared between) the
plan participant and the employer, providing thereby the proper incentive
to both to realize the benefits of a diversified portfolio. Even if the DC plan
participant elects to self-insure and avoid the purchase of this option, the
cost of the insurance can serve as a ‘‘monetized’’ version of the diversification
measure.
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In an early and closely related study directed at separating the components
of ex post portfolio performance, Fama (1972: 559) calculates a measure
he calls diversification, defined as the ‘‘extra portfolio return the manager’s
winners have to produce in order to make concentration of resources in
them worthwhile.’’ This quantity is precisely the difference in return (using
an ex ante interpretation) that is required to compensate for having to take
an undiversified position. Brennan and Torous (1999) have looked at the
cost (in terms of loss of certainty equivalence, using specific preference
assumptions) to investors in choosing an inadequately diversified position.
Meulbroek (2002) evaluates the cost to an employee of the grant of company
stock within a DC plan; her assessment of this cost relates to the value that is
lost due to the lowered level of diversification, an assessment closely related
to Fama’s computation of the foregone return. This lost value serves as a
measure of a dollar discount to the share price at which the employee would
have the same Sharpe-ratio (expected excess return to total portfolio risk,
or standard deviation of return) as the market portfolio. The efficiency
measure described in the present chapter at the plan participant’s chosen
level of expected return computes the fraction of total risk that the employee
takes, that is rewarded, from the menu of assets within the DC Plan. In
contrast to Fama’s and Meulbroek’s analysis, which is embedded in a capital
market equilibrium, I have embedded the problem within the more narrow
context of a set of DC plan menu assets.
In what follows, I first show how the measure of diversification efficiency
is computed. Next, I show how one can use Margrabe’s formula to find the
cost of private insurance for a DC plan portfolio that has a fraction allocated
to company stock, where I specialize that insurance to apply to the company
stock holdings, although it can be regarded in a more general context. A
final section concludes.
DC Plans and Portfolio Diversification
A typical participant in a DC plan is permitted to allocate his contribution,
as well as his company’s matching contribution (if and when that is permit-
ted under plan rules), between at least four to five professionally managed
investment alternatives (Mitchell and Schieber, 1998). One of these altern-
atives may be a money market fund; one may be a bond fund; one of the
funds might be a balanced fund, combining equities and bonds in an active
mix; and the remaining alternatives tend to be equity funds, of which one
might be a low-cost passive vehicle. Employees are typically offered a com-
pany stock fund as an investment choice, and especially for larger firms, the
company’s matching contribution is made in company stock. In some plans,
the employer’s matching contribution in company stock is not subject to the
employee’s self-directed asset allocation decision until the worker attains a
certain age. It is possible then for the portfolio allocation of the employee’s
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assets within the DC plan to become lopsided and inadequately diversified,
and especially so if the employee allocates part of his own contribution
toward company stock.
The benefits of diversification are by now very well known. In an early
paper, Samuelson (1967) showed that the outcome of diversification---equal
division of investment among N alternatives, sometimes called naive
diversification---follows, whenever the joint distribution of returns to securit-
ies shows symmetry in the interdependence among them. Finance textbooks
usually depict the variance (risk) reduction available from dividing a
portfolio’s wealth equally among an increasing number of securities, the
conclusion being drawn either from a simulation or from portfolios with
successively increasing numbers of randomly chosen equities. Benefits from
international diversification are also shown to depend on the strength of
correlation between domestic and foreign market indices. Indeed, more
sophisticated models for risk decomposition permit examination of the
exposure of a chosen portfolio to particular risk factors, to industry sectors,
and to investment styles.
AQ: Pls.
chk. Ref.
not listed
Bernheim (1998) notes that the average employee may have other fin-
ancial assets and private savings elsewhere, outside 401(k) plan assets, but
those savings typically will not guarantee an adequate level of post-retirement
income. One could argue that even though the employee’s 401(k) invest-
ments are not diversified, his overall savings may well be, although there is
little evidence supporting such conclusion. In addition, as is often observed,
the employee’s human capital is at least partly dependent on the company’s
fortunes, which might make a further tilt toward company stock within the
DC plan questionable.
Is it possible to design a measure that assesses the level of diversifica-
tion of an individual’s portfolio in the DC plan context? Conventional
measures of portfolio diversification rely on the number of securities
within the portfolio and the strength of the average correlation between
these securities (Goetzman and Kumar, 2001). Using these might lead an
observer to conclude that there is a sufficient number within the parti-
cipant’s portfolio, even though the weighting of one particular security
(company stock) might be several multiples of the weight in any other
security.
Another measure relates to the familiar mean--variance efficient frontier,
which is the locus of all minimum risk (variance of return) positions at dif-
ferent levels of reward (expected return). Given an individual’s particular
portfolio chosen from his set of opportunities; one may seek a feasible port-
folio chosen from the same set with less risk, at the same level of expected
return as the chosen portfolio. It would tell investors how ‘‘close’’ their actual
portfolios are to an efficient choice. The measure itself is not new, having
been proposed by Kandel and Stambaugh (1995) as a measure of closeness
to the mean--variance efficient frontier.5
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Figure 4-1. Portfolio efficient frontier. (Source: Author’s computations.)
In the familiar mean--variance framework, this involves moving from the
point (Z ) representing the individual’s portfolio due west to the point (X )
on the efficient frontier, as shown in Figure 4-1. Then the ratio of the
variance of X to that of Z
ηZ = σ
2
X
σ 2Z
(1)
represents a measure of how diversified Z is relative to X . At one extreme,
the measure ηz approaches 0: this happens when σ 2X  σ 2Z , or when the
individual’s chosen portfolio Z is ‘‘far’’ from the frontier and extremely
undiversified given the investment alternatives available to him. At the other
extreme, ηZ is equal to 1.0, when Z is on the frontier and coincides with
X . Here the individual has chosen an efficient portfolio, and no further
reduction in risk is possible at the chosen level of expected return.
In the current context, when investment allocations among risky assets
within a DC plan are of interest, we can adapt the computation of the frontier
in useful ways. First, we make the set of investment choices into which a plan
participant allocates his 401(k) wealth as the primitive assets with which the
mean variance frontier is generated. One may properly call such a frontier
one that embodies ‘‘constrained’’ mean--variance efficiency with respect to
the assets in the DC plan menu, which is itself a subset of the very large
universe of equity securities and portfolios on offer in the capital markets.
As described above, the typical DC plan menu includes at least three to
four mutual funds, including a stable value fund and a balanced fund, and
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some menus include a passive Index fund as well. Of course, the DC plan
menus that are of interest to us are those that include company stock as
an investment alternative in which the company’s contribution or some
self-directed allocation is made.
Second, we make a strong but simplifying assumption that enables
computation of the constrained mean--variance efficient frontier and the
‘‘closeness’’ measure, without requiring knowledge of expected returns to
the investment choices within the plan menu. The assumption implies that,
in addition to knowledge of the covariance matrix of returns to the menu
of assets within the plan, we can identify one asset or one portfolio of plan
menu assets that is on the efficient portion of the mean--variance frontier.
We denote this portfolio as ‘‘S ,’’ which for example, might be a blend of the
S&P500 and style and sector funds; or it could be a passive extended Index
fund. We simply require S to be a feasible portfolio chosen from the plan’s
menu. If a plan participant elects a portfolio Z from the permitted menu of
plan assets (including some company stock, held perhaps involuntarily) one
can find the feasible portfolio X , also chosen from the plan menu, that is on
the mean--variance efficient frontier and that has the same expected return
as her chosen portfolio Z . The efficiency measure of how well portfolio Z
is diversified can then be computed. This measure varies between zero and
one, where a value of one indicates the ideal---an efficiently chosen invest-
ment at its level of expected return. This may not be achievable if the plan
participant cannot reallocate the company’s matching contribution made
in company stock.
In order to compute this measure ηz , we must know the location of Z
and X . Essentially, one must know the locus of the mean--variance fron-
tier, given the set of investment opportunities. This requires knowledge of
the vector of expected returns and the variance--covariance matrix of the
returns and the investment alternatives, and access to a standard optimiz-
ation program that will trace the frontier. As long as there is a sufficient
history of the returns to these investment alternatives, the covariance mat-
rix can be estimated: indeed there are several commercially available risk
measurement services that can be used in this context.
Estimation of the vector of expected returns given to the list of available
plan assets is more difficult. Assessing the ex ante return for company stock
requires forecasting future earnings, which is difficult. Worse still, this fore-
cast might be the subject of disagreement when analyzing the influence of
company stock contributed into the plan participant’s portfolio. Forecasting
the expected returns to other investment alternatives within the plan menu
is equally difficult, whether we use a top-down or bottom-up approach. A
model-based approach requires forecasts of market risk premiums in the
context of an equilibrium pricing model.
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It is also well known that the average returns computed from historical
data (as estimates of expected returns) have low precision, and that their
use in constructing mean--variance efficient portfolios can lead to extreme
weights. Indeed, in practice, restrictions must be placed to constrain these
weights to acceptable levels, or some form of shrinkage must be employed
in adjusting the mean vector of returns.
The objective is to compute the ηz measure for any individual’s portfolio
chosen from a menu of DC plan, restricting the information available to
only the covariance matrix of returns and without recourse to a forecast of
the expected returns to each of the assets offered in the DC plan menu.
This appears clearly impossible in practice, for with that restricted informa-
tion set, one can only identify the global minimum variance portfolio V in
Figure 4-1. It turns out, however, that with one additional assumption, one
can compute the ηz measure for any portfolio Z chosen from that DC plan
menu. This assumption requires that: (A) One known portfolio combination
of the DC plan assets is on the efficient segment of the minimum variance frontier
constructed from the DC plan menu.
Figure 4-1 indicates the portfolio referred to in Assumption (A) as S ; we
require it to be on the positively sloped portion (the efficient segment)
of the frontier.6 This ensures that we know another point on the mean--
variance frontier, or equivalently one of the portfolios other than V , chosen
from the DC plan menu, that is on the mean--variance efficient frontier.
Notice that one need not forecast the expected returns to portfolio S or even
portfolio Z .
If the plan menu offers a low cost passive index fund, then many may
find the assumption that that passive vehicle was chosen as portfolio S to be
reasonable. If, in addition, the plan menu offers other style or sector funds
that provide exposure to value or growth stocks, or international assets, for
example, then a predefined and suitable mixture of these assets can be
assumed to be point S on the frontier.
Assumption (A) is strong: it supplants the need to forecast expected
returns to all the assets in the DC plan menu. Because the DC plan spon-
sor usually chooses from available investment funds to put into the menu
of plan choices, it is typically the case that each of these choices is reas-
onably diversified in terms of its own holdings, on a stand-alone basis. In
some instances, where the plan participant has not elected to self-direct an
allocation across the plan menu, the employer employs a default allocation
with an acceptable diversification level and an acceptable trade-off of risk
and return to some risk-averse investor (Choi et al., 2002).7 Nevertheless,
it need not follow that this choice, or a particular combination of available
choices, is on the minimum--variance frontier. Indeed, individuals with het-
erogeneous beliefs might disagree as to the values of the expected returns,
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so that they may not agree that a particular portfolio S is on the efficient
frontier.8
Computation of the Efficiency Measure
We next demonstrate how assumption (A) permits us to compute our effi-
ciency measure ηZ for a given portfolio Z . We define r˜j as the return to any
asset (or portfolio) j , and  as the (N × N positive definite) covariance
matrix of the returns to the i = 1, 2, . . . , N risky investment alternatives
within the DC plan’s menu of offerings. Let the N -th investment alternat-
ive be company stock. The individual’s total wealth in the 401(k) or DC
plan is comprised of investments made with his own contributions, as well
as matching company contributions. If individual Z elects to direct part or
all of those amounts, the vector wZ = {wZi i = 1, 2, . . . , N } represents the
resulting investment proportions in each of the N investment alternatives,
with
N∑
i=1
wZi = 1 (2)
These investment proportions are computed using the aggregate wealth
(including all company match contributions) in the plan.
The variance of the return on his portfolio is given by:
σ 2Z = w ′ZωZ (3)
The global minimum variance portfolio V has an associated vector of
investment proportions wZ , which is the solution to
Min{wVi ,i=1,2,...N }
w ′V wV subject to
N∑
i=1
wVi = 1 (4)
Notice that short sales are permitted, so the resulting global minimum
variance portfolio may have some negative weights. Of course, the global
minimum variance portfolio would not be optimal for any one unless he is
‘‘infinitely’’ risk-averse. These weights can be computed with the knowledge
of the covariance matrix alone, so given this information we can compute
the variance of V as:
σ 2V = w ′V wV (5)
To compute the ηZ measure, we need to find the portfolio X that is on
the frontier with the same mean as the individual’s chosen portfolio Z . The
following three well-known properties of the mean--variance frontier (see
Huang and Litzenberger, 1988), in addition to Assumption A, are sufficient
to locate the investment weights in portfolio X :
Property 1. The investment proportions in any portfolio on the minimum
variance frontier are a weighted sum (with weights that sum to unity) of the
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investment proportions of any two distinct portfolios that are also on the
minimum variance frontier.
Property 2. The covariance of the return on any portfolio with the global
minimum variance portfolio V is equal to the variance of the global
minimum portfolio’s return, σ 2V .
Property 3. The covariance of any portfolio Z with the portfolio X that is on
the minimum variance frontier and that has the same expected return as Z
is equal to the variance of the return to the frontier portfolio X . The first
property is well-known: it says that the mean--variance frontier is spanned
by any two portfolios that are on the frontier.9 It enables us to identify X as
a weighted average of the investment proportions in two portfolios that are
known to be on the frontier. In terms of our notation, if portfolios S , X , and
V are known to be on the frontier, then there is a number λ such that:
λwsi + (1 − λ)wVi = wXi for i = 1, 2, . . . , N (6)
The second and the third properties follow from the fact that the frontier
portfolios V and X have minimum variance, so that the separate portfolio
combinations of either Z and V or of Z and X , respectively, attain their
minimum variances when the weight on Z is set to zero. In other words
Properties 2 and 3 state that:
σZV ≡ Cov(r˜Z , r˜V ) = σ 2V and σZX ≡ Cov(r˜Z , r˜X ) = σ 2X . (7)
To find the value of λ we use these properties to compute
Cov(r˜Z , r˜X ) = Cov(r˜Z , λr˜S + (1 − λ)r˜V ) (8)
Using Property 3, the above relation is set equal to
Var(r˜X ) = Var(λr˜S + (1 − λ)r˜V ) (9)
The solution for λ from the above two relations is
λˆ = σSZ − σ
2
V
σ 2S − σ 2V
. (10)
Given this value for λˆwe can show that the efficiency measureηZ for portfolio
Z is
ηZ = σ
2
X
σ 2Z
= λˆ2 σ
2
S
σ 2Z
+ {1 − λˆ2}σ
2
V
σ 2Z
(11)
It is easy to verify that if the investor chooses S as her optimal portfolio so
that Z = S , then λˆ = ηZ = 1; and if he chose a portfolio on the mean
variance efficient frontier, such as Z = X , then by construction ηZ = 1.10
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It is natural to ask, in this context, whether it is possible to find a
portfolio Y , which has the same variance as Z but a higher expected return.
That frontier portfolio would be due north of Z in the mean--variance dia-
gram, as shown in Figure 4-1. Then the portfolios in the segment XY would
be preferred (by the preferences of investors using mean variance analysis)
to portfolio Z , as they would all offer either a higher mean return or a lower
variance, or both, relative to Z . In order to compute the investment propor-
tions in portfolio Y , we would use Property 1 to find a number γ such that
Y is a combination of V and S , satisfying the variance condition
σ 2Z = Var(r˜Y ) = Var(γ r˜S + (1 − γ )r˜V ). (12)
Solving the above relation for γˆ ,
γˆ =
√√√√σ 2Z − σ 2V
σ 2S − σ 2V
, (13)
so that the weights in portfolio Y can be recovered from
wYi = γˆwSi + (1 − γˆ )wVi , i = 1, 2, . . . , N . (14)
Note that if σ 2Z = σ 2S then γˆ =1 and Y = S .
Portfolios along the segment XY on the efficient frontier in Figure 4-1
will be strictly preferred to portfolio Z by all risk-averse plan participants
with preferences that are described by the mean and variance of their
portfolio returns. It should be emphasized that it is not possible to fix a
measure of ‘‘closeness’’ of the chosen portfolio Z to portfolio Y without
having information on the vector of mean returns to the available assets.
A more general analysis that examines the diversification level of a port-
folio that is chosen from the larger universe of all capital assets---not just the
DC plan menu---would find that the frontier would offer opportunities for
even further risk reduction at every level of expected return; the efficient
frontier would be to the left of the frontier constrained to DC plan choice is
shown in Figure 4-1. If we then specify a different portfolio, S ′, on that fron-
tier, then we could find the westward frontier portfolio, X ′, and recompute
the efficiency measure ηZ in the same way as shown above. Those computed
measures would generally be smaller (reflecting the possibly additional risk
reduction obtainable from the larger universe of assets) than computed
from the constrained frontier. If, in addition, we were to estimate expected
returns and risks to the larger universe of assets, and we assumed the exist-
ence of a riskless asset, then the frontier would collapse11 to the familiar
Capital Market Line (CML). In this case, we could compute both the reduc-
tion in risk to the CML at the same level of expected return as Z , and the
foregone expected return at the same level of risk as Z (Meulbroek, 2002).
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The efficiency measure ηZ is equal to the square of the correlation
coefficient between portfolios Z and X ; it is therefore the same as the diver-
sification measure corresponding to the R2 of a market model regression of
the returns to portfolio Z regressed on a chosen benchmark X . Such a meas-
ure is discussed in Sharpe (1970). Many performance measurement services
(for example, Morningstar) report the R2 measure in the context of a regres-
sion of fund returns on the returns to a chosen market index. Here we have
found portfolio X from the knowledge of the DC plan menu’s choices and
designed it to have the same mean as the participant’s chosen portfolio Z .
Sample Calculations
Suppose now that the 401(k) portfolio Z chosen by a plan participant
has a fraction wZN of the portfolio wealth invested in company stock, the
N -th asset, either by virtue of the company contribution made in locked-up
company stock or due to a self-directed contribution. The remaining frac-
tion (1−wZN ) is distributed among the other choices within the plan menu.
Then the ηZ measure for his portfolio would indicate the extent to which
his portfolio was undiversified.
We can easily compute ηZ for different values of the fraction invested in
company stock. For simplicity, assume that the remaining fraction is invested
in the mean--variance efficient portfolio S ; the efficiency numbers therefore
correspond to a ‘‘best’’ case, and in practice, participant portfolios are likely
to be less efficient at each level of company stock holding. The following
parameters are used: σV = 0.1, σS = 0.18, and we use cases with low, average,
and high risk company whose ‘‘market’’ betas βN computed with respect to
S are 0.8, 1.0, and 1.2 respectively.
Table 4-1 shows values for the efficiency measure ηZ for holdings of com-
pany stock from 10 percent to 90 percent. Mitchell and Utkus (Chapter 3,
this volume) report that the fraction of self-directed wealth in 401(k)
plans averages nearly 30 percent; when the company match contribution
is included, it averages approximately 53 percent. The table shows that for
these values of the holdings of company stock the efficiency measures are,
in the best case, 0.64 and 0.39, respectively. In some larger firms (Purcell,
2002), participants have holdings of company stock as high as 90 percent,
and for these portfolios, the ηZ measure is the least in each case.
It is noteworthy that DB plans are restricted to holding no more than
10 percent in company stock; at that level of holding, and assuming that the
balance is in an efficient portfolio, the efficiency measure is in the 90-percent
range for the three cases shown in Table 4-1.
Insurance Against a Decline in Portfolio Wealth
due to Company Stock Investment
The diversification measure discussed in the previous section has the poten-
tial to be a useful tool, especially to those familiar with Modern Portfolio
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TABLE 4-1 Values of the Diversification Measure ηZ
Company
Weighting
wZN
Low Risk
(σN = 0.35,β = 0.8)
Average Risk
(σN = 0.48,β = 1.0)
High Risk
(σN = 0.60,β = 1.2)
σZ ηZ σZ ηZ σZ ηZ
0.1 0.1793 0.97 0.1855 0.94 0.1920 0.91
0.2 0.1843 0.88 0.2012 0.80 0.2182 0.74
0.3 0.1945 0.76 0.2250 0.64 0.2544 0.56
0.4 0.2093 0.63 0.2546 0.50 0.2968 0.43
0.5 0.2277 0.51 0.2881 0.39 0.3432 0.33
0.6 0.2489 0.41 0.3245 0.31 0.3922 0.27
0.7 0.2723 0.33 0.3628 0.25 0.4429 0.22
0.8 0.2973 0.26 0.4025 0.20 0.4948 0.18
0.9 0.3236 0.21 0.4432 0.16 0.5475 0.15
In constructing the table, we assume the standard deviation of the return to the global min-
imum variance portfolio, σV = 0.1; and the standard deviation of the return to portfolio S ,
σS = 0.18.
Source : Author’s computations.
Note: These computations assume that the DC plan participant has a fraction wZN of his port-
folio Z , including the company matching contribution, in company stock, the N -th asset; and
the balance of the portfolio investment proportion (1−wZN ) in a feasible portfolio S , which is
on the efficient portion of the minimum variance efficient frontier, constructed with the assets
within the DC plan menu. The measure ηZ is the ratio of the variance of his portfolio Z to
the variance of a portfolio X that is on the efficient frontier and that has the same expected
return as Z .
Theory. To others, it may appear take on the aspect of an amulet, with no
easily comprehensible benefit to increasing the diversification level within
their portfolios. Nevertheless, it is possible to provide the DC plan parti-
cipant with a more immediate and tangible measure of his undiversified
stance by monetizing this measure into a price.
Suppose the DC plan participant were offered insurance, for a fee, that
would give him the return on the better performing of two assets: com-
pany stock, or a well-diversified efficient portfolio S , both feasible choices
within his DC plan menu. This return guarantee would be applied to the
dollar value of his chosen investment in company stock, at the expiration of
the term of the insurance. This insurance contract is equivalent to provid-
ing him with an exchange option, first analyzed by Margrabe (1977). The
exchange option here permits the DC plan participant to exchange his
ownership of shares in company stock for a fixed number of units of the
efficiently diversified portfolio S at the option’s expiry date. The right to
‘‘swap’’ his ownership of the company stock into a fixed number of units of
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the diversified portfolio S would be exercised if the value of the latter were
greater than the value of the shares invested in company stock, on the final
maturity date of the option.
It is possible for competitive market makers to provide this insurance in a
more general setting. For example, it is theoretically possible to provide the
plan participant insurance against the ‘‘bad’’ outcome that his investment
in a portfolio (Z ) chosen from the plan menu, including company stock,
might decline relative to the performance of the more efficient portfolio
X , just as in the previous section. This form of insurance has the property
that it must be tailor-made to every participant’s chosen portfolio. Rather
than discuss the private provision of diverse insurance to a heterogeneous
pool of investors with different needs, we confine the discussion here to
insurance and the related exchange options that apply to company stock
and an efficient portfolio as the benchmark. This focuses attention on the
main reason a typical plan participant’s portfolio becomes prone to substan-
tial and precipitous declines: overweighting in company stock. By making
available the option to swap that investment for a diversified alternative,
we would provide him with an insured position at the termination of the
option---in the event that company stock declined---providing, thereby, edu-
cation on the benefits of diversification. Furthermore, a firm that provides
a matching contribution in company stock would then recognize the cost
incurred in protecting the employee’s retirement savings from declines due
to the presence of the company stock granted to the employee, at least for
period during which the company stock remained locked in the participant’s
portfolio.12
It is well-known that the Margrabe exchange option’s value can be found
without resorting to investors’ aversion to risk or knowledge of expected
returns, by using the assumptions and ideas that underlie the Black-Scholes
analysis. The exchange option’s price depends upon the volatilities of com-
pany stock and the efficient portfolio S , and on the correlation between
them. In particular, we assume that the employer’s matching contribu-
tion is $1,000 in company stock; that the volatilities of the continuously
compounded rate of return on company stock and diversified benchmark
portfolio S are given by σ and σS , respectively; that the correlation coef-
ficient between the returns on these assets is given by ρ, and that these
assets pay a continuous dividend at rate q and qS , respectively. Then the cur-
rent (date t) value of the exchange option that permits the participant to
exchange the company stock for the future (date T ) value of $1,000 initially
invested in the diversified benchmark S is given by:
1,000 exp{−qS (T − t)}N (d1)− 1,000 exp{−q(T − t)}N
(
d1 − σˆ
√
T − t
)
,
(15)
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where:
σˆ =
√
σ 2 + σ 2s − 2ρσσS , d1 =
(qS − q + 0.5σˆ 2)(T − t)
σˆ (T − t) , (16)
and the function N (x) represents the standard cumulative normal probab-
ility evaluated at x . The volatility σˆ is the standard deviation of a position
that is effectively long $1 in the benchmark asset S and short $1 in company
stock.
By virtue of a self-directed allocation or due to the company’s matching
contribution, an investor who owns $1,000 worth of company stock and
acquires the exchange option will have a dollar amount at the option’s expiry
date T that guarantees a return that is greater of the return on company
stock or the benchmark asset S .
Sample Valuations
Next we compute the cost of such an insurance policy and show that it
becomes very expensive for longer terms. We assume typical parameters for
the company stock (β = 1, σ = 48 percent), and we further assume that the
volatility of the benchmark asset S is σS = 18 percent. For simplicity, we posit
that neither the stock nor the benchmark asset S pays dividends. The cost of
insurance to obtain the better performing return between company stock
and portfolio S on every $1,000 invested in company stock turns out to be
$178, or 17.8 percent for a one-year term, a cost that will appear prohibitive
to most investors.13 Administration proposals suggest a 3-year term over
which a company’s matching contribution may not be reallocated. If an
employee wished to purchase such insurance for 3 years, the cost would rise
to $303, or 30.3 percent.14 If we were to use stocks with varying volatilities,
then Figures 4-2 and 4-3 show the cost of the option for 1- and 3-year terms,
respectively; in these graphs we have retained the β of the company stock
at one.
Clearly, an undiversified position can involve a substantial implicit insur-
ance cost. For cases where the employer’s matching contribution is made
in company stock, the price of the exchange option is equivalent to a
cost imposed on the employee (who might otherwise hold an efficient,
well-diversified alternative) for the term that the granted stock remains
untradeable.
Implementation
A provider of this form of portfolio insurance will typically seek to hedge by
buying a number of units in portfolio S and shorting a certain number of
shares in company stock, both these numbers corresponding to the hedge
ratios dictated by Margrabe’s formula. In actual implementation, however,
it is possible (for example) for the grant of company stock to be coupled
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Figure 4-2. Exchange option value (1 year). (Source: Author’s computations.)
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Figure 4-3. Exchange option value (3 year). (Source: Author’s computations.)
with exchange options, in which case no explicit short position must be held.
Here the insurance is effected by shifting funds between company stock and
the feasible efficient portfolio S , such that at the terminal date, the funds
are totally in the better performing of the two assets. Of course, such shifting
of funds implicitly assumes that the company stock is tradeable.
One way in which the insurance can be effected would be to grant
the matching contribution in company stock and in the efficient portfo-
lio S , in equal dollar amounts. Then instructions would be given to trade
out of the underperforming asset and into the better-performing asset in
incremental amounts each period. If such a procedure were implemented
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with the incremental trades corresponding to the changing hedge ratios in
Margrabe’s formula, then the portfolio will implicitly replicate the insurance
option. Transactions costs in these cases will be sizable, the more volatile the
stock and the weaker is the correlation between the stock and the efficient
portfolio.
Conclusion
The lack of diversification found in privately managed DC pension accounts
has important ramifications. A wealthy and well-informed investor whose
position is not well-diversified can take action quickly to avoid serious
declines to his retirement wealth. For an ill-informed investor, whose 401(k)
plan represents the bulk of his savings for retirement, the consequences of
a badly diversified position loaded in company stock, especially when part
of that stock is frozen, are very grave indeed.
Although much has been done to educate and guide investors, it is still
the case that they often end up eliciting badly diversified positions. In the
case of 401(k) portfolios, much of this might be avoidable. A first step in this
direction is to design a measure that reveals to an investor how efficiently
chosen his 401(k) portfolio is, on a stand-alone basis, ignoring his non-DC
plan wealth. Most measures designed to answer such questions must account
for heterogeneous investor preferences, and they therefore rely on estim-
ates about future risks and returns. The measure proposed in this chapter
uses standard mean--variance analysis, so it avoids the difficult problem of
forecasting the mean returns to investments within the DC plan menu. It
does require us to make a strong assumption about the frontier, namely that
we know at least one efficient portfolio on it, but this may be an assumption
that is more palatable than attempting to obtain agreement on expected
returns to company stock and the other choices within the plan.
Companies typically emphasize the incentive effects of stock ownership by
their employees (both inside and outside their pension accounts), which has
not been addressed in this chapter. It is noteworthy, however, that DB plans
have stricter diversification rules, and that in the United States at least, DB
plan participants have access to government-mandated pension insurance.
Our research shows that a privately obtainable insurance policy would be
very costly, if it were to assure that 401(k) investments in company stock will
do at least as well as a diversified position, even in the short term.
Notes
1For a comprehensive discussion of these issues, see Mitchell and Schieber (1998).
2This finding is not new, for the allocations by retail investors in equity portfolios
have been distributed across a handful (typically three to four) stocks. Early evidence
on this point is provided by Blume and Friend (1975) and more recent analysis by
Goetzman and Kumar (2001).
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3Several studies have documented the allocation and participation behavior of DC
plan participants and suggested explanations; see Benartzi (2001) Benartzi and
Thaler (2001) and Choi et al. (2001).
4Many online services provide a simulation platform where investors may evalu-
ate the impact of various allocation alternatives on retirement wealth (see Bodie,
Chapter 2, this volume). These platforms typically employ forecasts of expec-
ted returns to the investment choices (including company stock), which may
be the source of substantial difference of opinion when advocating a shift in
allocation. This procedure for assessing how efficiently a plan participant has diver-
sified his 401(k) portfolio requires more information than the measure described
below.
5The connection between mean variance efficiency of a portfolio and the diversi-
fication level characterized by the smallness of weights in the portfolio is studied
by Green and Hollifield (1992). They show that the existence of a well-diversified
portfolio on the frontier depends on a bound that relates expected returns on the
portfolio to its covariance with other assets.
6The figure is an example drawn with a level of σS > σZ . The arguments in the body
of the text are general and apply even when σS ≤ σZ .
7One could argue that default allocation sometimes invests in money funds or bonds
and that it ought to have a larger allocation to equities, but that is not the thrust of
the present chapter.
8Indeed, it is well known that a test of whether portfolio S is on the efficient frontier
is equivalent to a test of whether expected returns to assets are linearly related to
their betas with respect to S (see Fama, 1976; Roll, 1977). Kandel and Stambaugh
(1995) show that the closeness of a portfolio to the frontier need not imply a nearly
linear relationship between expected returns and betas.
9Property 1 in conjunction with Assumption A (and knowledge of the covariance
matrix of plan asset returns) says in effect that the investment proportions of all
portfolios that are frontier portfolios are known. This means that agreement as to S
being on the frontier is equivalent to agreement as to the investment proportions of
all frontier portfolios, but what we cannot specify is their location as to scale along
the Y -axis in the traditional mean--variance diagram.
10If the employee chooses the global minimum variance portfolio so that Z = V
then λˆ = 0 and ηZ = 1; but this would be a suboptimal choice. It is possible that the
value of λˆ is negative: this occurs only if the investor’s chosen portfolio has a lower
expected return than the minimum variance portfolio V.
11Here the plot referred to is that of mean returns versus standard deviation of
returns.
12We can always interpret our computations and Figure 4-1 to portfolio Z in the
general case; it is possible to consider the cost of the insurance as applying to either
portfolio Z or to company stock.
13Plan participants and company managers might disagree as to the volatility levels
and correlation assumed in computing the cost of the insurance. I have chosen para-
meter values that are representative; the correlation between company stock and the
index portfolio S is given by ρ = β × (σS /σ) = (0.18/0.48) = 0.375 The higher the
correlation coefficient, the lower the cost of the insurance, ceteris paribus. It should
be noted, however, that even favorable estimates for volatilities and correlations will
give prohibitive expensive premiums, as shown in the figures that follow.
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14Not surprisingly, a 25-year old employee who wanted to buy an insurance policy
on company stock that he cannot reallocate until he is 50 years old, would have to
pay $739 per $1,000 of stock, retaining the assumption that this is an average beta
company stock.
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